SA/LW and the Arms Trade Treaty
Despite the efforts of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and disarmament and
human rights activists worldwide, the global arms trade continues to exacerbate the situation
caused by conventional weapons and, in particular, small arms/light weapons. Proliferation
of SA/LW not only fuels conflict, but also disrupts development in war-ravaged regions. The
following article provides an overview of SA/LW-control issues and remediation efforts. It also
considers the progress of the international movement in support of an arms-trade treaty.
by Zach Wall and Lauren Nicole Hill [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]

T

he U.N. process to develop the
Arms Trade Treaty began in 2006
with the adoption of General
Assembly Resolution 61/89, which requested the Secretary-General form a
Group of Governmental Experts to investigate the feasibility, scope and mandate of a comprehensive convention and
report its findings to the 63rd session of
the General Assembly. The international
treaty campaign led by activists, NGOs,
officials and policy experts, was started
years earlier, however, and has grown
considerably since its inception. In 2008,
thousands of demonstrators around the
world voiced their demand for greater
accountability of the world’s arms producers and exporters, and for the continued cooperation of the member states to
work toward a consensus. As expected,
the proposed treaty will cover transfers
The co-authors of the Arms Trade Treaty resolution (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan,
of a variety of conventional weapons, inKenya and the United Kingdom) launch the ATT at a meeting as part of the 63 rd United Nations General
cluding small arms/light weapons.
Assembly session, which began 16 September 2009.
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In late October 2008, 147 nations
voted in favor of moving forward with
the negotiation of a comprehensive U.N. treaty to regulate the
The proposed treaty, known as the ATT, will be the first legallytrade of conventional weapons worldwide. On 24 December,
binding, international agreement of its kind. Proponents claim
the General Assembly officially adopted the draft resoluthat existing programs designed to police the arms trade have
tion, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common
made important strides, but that stronger controls are essenInternational Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer
tial to confront the growing humanitarian crisis caused by
of Conventional Arms, calling for an Open-Ended Working
unchecked arms proliferation. Furthermore, non-state actors
Group to convene semi-annually over the next three years “to
exploit gaps in existing policy to acquire weapons used to unfurther consider those elements in the report of the Group of
dermine development and human rights.
Governmental Experts where consensus could be developed
for their inclusion in an eventual legally binding treaty.”1 The
Small Arms/Light Weapons
Open-Ended Working Group is not tasked with negotiating
Among conventional weapons, SA/LW are particularly
the treaty but with examining issues that could be addressed
problematic as they are relatively easy to use and are easily acin a treaty. Further action is required by the United Nations
cessible. The term “small arms” refers to a category of weapons
General Assembly to actually start the negotiation.
designed for individual use, including pistols, machine and
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SA-7s being prepared for destruction in Montenegro.
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submachine guns, assault rifles, and hand grenades, among
others. “Light weapons” typically include conventional weapons that are designed to be operated by a group of two or more
individuals (although they may be operated by individual
combatants as well). These weapons include heavy machine
guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, and man-portable air-defense systems (also known as
MANPADS). Moreover, they are often the weapons of choice
of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and
paramilitary insurgents. 2
MANPADS and U.S. SA/LW Remediation
MANPADS pose a unique threat to global safety as these
light weapons threaten the security of military and civilian
aircraft. MANPADS use infrared technology and other advanced technology to deploy surface-to-air missiles directed at
aircraft. Despite the magnitude of damage MANPADS yield,
they require minimal training to operate, are easily concealed
and can be transported in the trunks of cars or even smaller
cargo areas. Consequently, they are considered some of the
most potentially destabilizing contemporary weapons systems
available today and are associated with irregular warfare. 3
MANPADS are relatively inexpensive weapons, which rest on
the shoulders of their users and weigh as little as 30 pounds (14
kilograms). Conservative estimates suggest there are at least
500,000 MANPADS in the world today, many of which are
readily available on the black market to NSAs.4
The issue of MANPADS proliferation is a national-defense
priority for the United States. The U.S. Department of State intensified efforts to prevent NSAs from acquiring MANPADS
after the attempted shootdown of a commercial airliner leaving Mombassa, Kenya, in late 2002. Since then, the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State has assisted 27
nations in destroying more than 27,000 MANPADS missiles
and securing those that remain in national stocks. PM/WRA
works to keep weapons from re-circulating and destabilizing
hard-won but fragile peace in post-conflict areas where the
threat of illicit SA/LW and MANPADS falling into the hands
of NSAs is most acute. For example, in 2003–04, PM/WRA
provided technical assistance in destroying 33,000 SA/LW,
including 45 MANPADS in post-civil war Liberia. 5

The United States remains committed to combating illicit arms trafficking
in conflict and post-conflict areas around
the world. PM/WRA strives to limit the
access of terrorist or criminal groups to
conventional weapons and munitions
from national stockpiles or abandoned
caches. Since 2001, PM/WRA has assisted with SA/LW-remediation efforts in 36
countries, securing weapons stockpiles
and destroying 1.3 million excess weapons and more than 50,000 tons of ordnance. However, weapons destruction
addresses only one aspect of the larger
problem, and arms-control approaches
that merely focus on keeping stockpiles
secure and destroying excess weapons
are incomplete. For this reason, the U.S. government endorses
a “cradle to the grave” approach to weapons exports and imports. The United States regulates brokering activities on all
of its weapons, and U.S. brokering laws and regulations are
“considered the most robust in the world.”6
International efforts to combat the global SA/LW problem
have resulted in strengthening controls on the export and
transfer of SA/LW, including MANPADS. Non-proliferation
strategies in these regions help to secure weapons, ensure that
governments have policies on control and proliferation, and
reduce the number of MANPADS available to NSAs.4
The United Nations and Illicit Arms Trade
The issue of illegal small-arms proliferation first came under the spotlight of the United Nations during the mid-1990s.
Prompted by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General
formed a Group of Governmental Experts to investigate the
humanitarian implications of the illicit SA/LW trade. Then,
in July 2001, the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held
in New York, and the participating states agreed to adopt the
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the
Illicit Arms Trade in All Its Aspects.6 The Programme of Action
aims to curb illicit small-arms trafficking at the national, regional and global levels. Since its implementation, the program has served as an important framework for preventing
international illegal small-arms trade.
At the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made
in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, 26 June–7
July 2006, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan said of the
United Nations’ arms-control pursuits, “Our targets remain
unscrupulous arms brokers, corrupt officials, drug-trafficking
syndicates, criminals and others who bring death and mayhem
into our communities, who ruin lives and destroy in minutes
the labor of years. To halt the destructive march of armed conflict, we must stop such purveyors of death.” 7 In the summer
of 2008, a third semi-annual meeting convened, marking the
seventh year of the PoA’s implementation. Despite significant
strides since 2001, many, including Secretary-General Ban KiMoon, have noted the generally slow progress in adequately
addressing the Programme of Action’s national-, regionaland global-level objectives. The Secretary-General previously
reported, “At the global level, States were unable to agree to
substantive outcomes of the biannual meetings,” owing in part
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to the fact that the PoA “does not provide a specific framework
to facilitate international assistance and cooperation among
states. Hence, states have had difficulty finding cooperative
structures and linking needs with resources.”8
Working Toward a Treaty
Presently, a single, comprehensive, legally-binding instrument for regulating the international transfer of conventional
weapons does not exist. For pragmatic reasons, existing conventional weapons treaties, such as the Ottawa Convention9
and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons10
(which includes weapons with “indiscriminant” effects), are
limited in scope and regulate only specific types of arms trafficking. At the regional level, many governments have implemented agreements aimed at curbing conventional weapons
proliferation in recent years. Some of these agreements are the
Central American Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers11 (2006),
the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons,
Their Ammunition and other Related Materials12 (2006), and
The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction

would hold states accountable for international weapons
transfers, ensuring that those weapons should not be used to
commit human-rights abuses, either directly or indirectly.
The text of the ATT, therefore, should include stipulations
about the use or likely use of arms.16
Feasibility, Scope and Parameters
In December 2006, due in part to the effort of international activists, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution
61/89.17 A majority of nations (153) voted in favor of the resolution, which prompted the Secretary-General to (a) solicit
member states’ views on a speculative arms-trade treaty and
(b) form a Group of Governmental Experts representing 28
countries to investigate the “feasibility, scope and parameters”
of such a treaty. This group convened for three sessions and, in
August 2008, nearly issued a final report18 with its findings.
Ninety-six states submitted views on the ATT, and among
them, 89 concluded that such an instrument was feasible, but
voiced concerns about the obstacles in implementing an attainable treaty. These reservations included, for example, the

Control Arms campaigners hold envelopes containing Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s message outside the
U.N. headquarters in New York City. The Control Arms campaign is an international campaign run by Oxfam
International, Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms. It calls for a strong
treaty to stop the transfer of weapons which fuel conflict, poverty and human rights abuses.
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of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
and the Horn of Africa13 (2005), and have been met with varying degrees of success.14 Nevertheless, an internationally-recognized and legally-binding measure carrying the clout of the
Ottawa Convention or the recently adopted Convention on
Cluster Munitions15 has not yet been formulated. However,
campaigners for an arms-trade treaty have made significant
headway since 2006.
The Control Arms campaign—a collaborative effort of the
NGOs Amnesty International, Oxfam International and the
International Action Network on Small Arms—has worked
toward the goal of a global arms-trade treaty since October
2003. The treaty envisioned by the Control Arms campaign
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probable reluctance of major arms exporters to comply with a
treaty, the inability of some states to live up to the challenges
of implementing the treaty, and the overall task of crafting an
ATT capable of satisfying the particular interests of all member states.19 The feasibility of an arms-trade treaty is dependent on both its scope and its parameters. According to the
Group of Governmental Experts’ final report, to be feasible,
the proposed treaty would need to have “clear definitions
and be fair, objective, balanced, non-political, non-discriminatory and universal within the framework of the United
Nations.”18 Therefore, an international consensus on what
types of weapons should be included, as well as what kinds of
transactions constitute “transfer,” (i.e., the scope of the treaty)

will be essential to the negotiation of the treaty. The Group of
Governmental Experts concluded that the parameters of the
ATT should be consistent with the existing international human rights laws, and it should not infringe on the sovereign
rights of individual states. The Group of Governmental Experts
also determined that a realistic framework should take into
account issues such as terrorism, organized crime, socioeconomic development and regional stability. Furthermore, the
group recommended national annual transparency reports be
written and presented to members similar to those required
by the Ottawa Convention and the CCW.
2009 and Onward
Following the release of the Group of Governmental
Experts report, the mobilization of international support for a
second ATT resolution continued with renewed energy during
the 63rd session of the U.N. General Assembly. A week of action
took place 13–19 September 2008, during which disarmament
campaigners from all over the world held demonstrations
and urged member states to vote in favor of continuing the
development of an international treaty. On 21 October 2008,
days before the vote, Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop
Desmond Tutu of South Africa issued a video message urging
member states to “end the slaughter” wrought by the international arms trade, announcing, “All around the world, people
are watching, waiting and holding you to account. They are
demanding an ATT with human rights at its heart. It is down
to each and every one of you to see it done.”20
At the 63rd session of the U.N. General Assembly on
23 October 2008, 133 nations voted in favor of the new
resolution, while one state abstained and 119 opposed. The
decision demonstrated continued international support
for the development and eventual implementation of the
treaty. The U.N. process, which is open to all member states,
will continue over the next three years with semi-annual
meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group. During this
phase, the Open-Ended Working Group will convene for
six one-week sessions to consider the recommendations
of the Group of Governmental Experts and address key
concerns of the treaty’s scope and implementation. The
first of these sessions took place 2–6 March 2009, in New
York City, and was attended by numerous member-state
representatives, including the United States. According to a
statement the U.S. representative21 made to the meeting, the
United States is planning to be active in developing effective
outcomes from the findings of the Open-Ended Working
Group. However, it is still too early to determine whether
“the discussions show promise for effective and positive
contribution to solving the problems” of the illicit arms
trade and SA/LW proliferation. 5
The second session of the Open-Ended Working Group
convened in New York City in July 2009. The group will
presented a report of its discussions to the 64th session of
the U.N. General Assembly this fall. 22 The ATT is still in the
early stages of formation and the discussions will continue
for a minimum of three years. The efforts of millions of
supporters across the globe have not gone unnoticed, and
the ATT’s progress has been apparent, especially in 2008.
At least one important question for the future remains and
it involves the role the United States, a global leader in SA/
LW remediation efforts, will play in the treaty-negotiation
process. Nevertheless, the relative success of the Ottawa

Convention and the adoption of the Convention on Cluster
Munitions in 2008 indicate that the international community
remains committed to waging the war against unchecked
weapons proliferation.
See Endnotes, Page 113
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